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SMILING WITH GOD:
REFLECTIONS ON CHRISTIANITY
AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMOR
Robert C. Roberts

This essay evaluates two arguments found in John Morreall's Taking Laughter Seriously:
That Christianity is incompatible with a sense of humor since the latter requires that a
person take nothing with absolute seriousness, and that God can have no sense of humor
because he is omniscient. I point out that seriousness about something is a necessary
condition of humor and that what people find funny is in part a function of what they
take seriously. I illustrate these points with examples from Samuel Johnson and Soren
Kierkegaard. Then I show how ultimate seriousness is compatible with a sense of humor,
by appeal to Kierkegaard's notion of a "way out" of responsibility for the object of one's
seriousness. Here I illustrate with St. Francis of Assisi, William James, and Kierkegaard.
Morreall's claim that God's omniscience rules out his having a sense of humor turns on
the thesis, fundamental to his book, that humor depends on "psychological shift," which
he mistakenly identifies with surprise. I distinguish these concepts, show that humor
should not be construed even in terms of the (weaker) concept of psychological shift,
and suggest a way of understanding God' s omniscience such that it is compatible with
his sense of humor.

In a recent book on the psychology of humor' John Morreall claims that Christianity is an intrinsically humorless outlook, thus putting himself rather in disagreement with Kierkegaard, who calls it "the most humorous view of life in
world-history."2 First, "the person with a sense of humor will .. .live with the
awareness that nothing is important in an absolute way."3 Since for Christians
the kingdom of God and being fit for it are important in an absolute way,
Christians can have no sense of humor. If they do occasionally smile or titter,
it is only "because they fall short of a whole-hearted commitment to Christianity."4
Secondly God cannot have a sense of humor because, being omniscient, He
cannot be surprised by incongruities, and surprise is an essential part of "the
psychological shift that is behind laughter.'" Thus we have the grim picture of
a f;traitlaced all-knowing Father presiding dourly over His brood of stolid little
heavenly overachievers. Morreall refutes Christianity not by showing it false,
but by showing it so repulsive that God help us if it isn't!
But happily for God and His litter, both of Morreall's theses are false. Humor
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is not incompatible with being ultimately serious about life; indeed an ultimate
orienting seriousness about life gives one's sense of humor a depth and integrity
and scope that it will not otherwise have. And surprise is not essential to perceiving
incongruities as humorous.

Let me start with the first thesis. Morreall says "Now if we ask what kinds
of situations people are in fact capable of finding humorous, I think the answer
is that any incongruity whatever might amuse someone."6 He goes on to say that
from the moral point of view there are, however, limits on what it is permissible
to be amused by . We ought no to be amused when horrible disasters befall
people. But surely there are not only moral limits on amusement, but psychological limits on what incongruities can amuse us. For example, the inconguity
must be susceptible of an interpretation in terms which connect it with human
interest. It is true, as Morreall notes, that the incongruous object need not itself
be a person,7 but without some human interest in the matter of the incongruity,
there can be no humor. An anomalous motion of a planet is incongruous, but it
would be extraordinary if someone found it funny. If somebody did find it funny,
it would tum out that he was thinking of the anomaly as upsetting somebody's
astronomical theory, or as being a trick that God plays on us, or in some other
way that places the anomaly in the context of human concerns. And it seems to
me that, other things being equal, the more closely the incongruity is connected
with somebody's projects and concerns, the funnier it wiII be. The funniest jokes
are about people; animals are funny largely because they lend themselves to
personification; and the bowling ball in Morreall's refrigerator is funny (if it is)
because it fails to be an item people eat, much less a perishable one or one more
delicate when served chiIIed, and is something people roll down bowling alleys
on Friday nights.
Morreall points out that "what a person finds incongruous depends on what
he finds congruous"': if we had no relatively fixed expectations about the way
things go, we would perceive no incongruities and thus have no sense of humor.
But a similar principle, which he seems not to notice, is that incongruities would
not be funny to us if we had no serious interest in anything. Just as incongruity
presupposes the "normal," so the pleasant (as well as the unpleasant) perception
of it presupposes an interest in the matter of the incongruity-an interest other
than the interest in being amused. When Long-Chen-pa the Buddhist lama says,
"Since everything is but an apparition perfect in being what it is, having nothing
to do with good or bad, acceptance or rejection, one may well burst out in
laughter"9 his laughter itself betrays him. Were he as indifferent as his philosophy
prescribes, he would also be humor-blind. For all its power to "distance" us
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from "ourselves," humor is as parasitic upon serious interest as it is upon normal
congruity.
The relativity of humor to interest is evident in the fact that humor has special
interest groups. While almost everybody likes humor about sex (including many
who won't admit it), business people especially enjoy stories about business
misadventures, and church people especially like those stories about conversations
between St. Peter and clerical knockers at the pearly gates. We are more alert
to humorous incongruities concerning things and persons we love~ur children,
our lovers, our heroes, ourselves. The refrigerated bowling ball is funnier if you
are a bowler and funnier if the refrigerator is yours, and funnier if your friends
put it there; the glitter of humor would be less if you found it in a stranger's
fridge and had no idea how it got there, and were indifferent to bowling. It
seems to me there are two ways in which interest fosters humor: intrinsically,
by engaging us with the incongruous situation, and by determining which set of
concepts will shape our vision.
2

James Boswell records the following remark of Samuel Johnson: "Talking of
a penurious gentleman of our acquaintance, Johnson said, 'Sir, he is narrow,
not so much from avarice, as from impotence to spend his money. He cannot
find it in his heart to pour out a bottle of wine; but he would not much care if
it should SOUr."1O The humor here is pretty universally accessible. Almost everybody can sympathize with the desire to pile up goods; and so the incongruity of
someone complacently letting his wine sour if only he can avoid dispensing it,
is both obvious to us, and comical. At least it takes no more than an incisive
and colorful formulation like Johnson's to make it so.
Compare with this the following from Kierkegaard. A man becomes aware
of a spiritual defect in himself, something he cannot accept in his makeup. But
instead of addressing it head-on by attempting to correct it, or by resigning
himself to it, or by repenting of it, he ignores it, hoping it will go away. Every
now and again he allows himself just enough self-awareness to check whether
the defect has gone away; but after a while he gives up the hope of that. Turning
away from self-examination altogether he immerses himself in outward life such
as business, family and politics. From this vantage point he occasionally remembers his former despair, and considers that he has overcome it. Kierkegaard
comments: "It is impossible to depict this kind of despair accurately without a
certain touch of satire. It is comical that he wants to talk about having been in
despair; it is appalling that after the conquering of despair (according to his
view), his condition is in fact despair."" The humor that Kierkegaard describes
is far less accessible than that in the remark from Johnson. With effort we can
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reconstruct his point of view, and through empathetic imagination get a little
feeling for the humor; but still, most of us don't share it. And the reason, simply
stated, is that we are not at home in the terms of construal that bring out the
incongruity of this man thinking he has overcome his despair. From our point
of view, it hardly seems an incongruity at all. We are not attuned to the spirtual
issues about which Kierkegaard is writing, and our lack of attunement is traceable,
in part, to a deficiency of concern for moral and spiritual integrity.
In connection with Morreall' s thesis that a sense of humor excludes any
ultimate seriousness, the lesson I draw from Kierkegaard here is that the concern
for integrity of self, far from excluding a sense of humor, is the foundation of
one. And it is at least a very good candidate for being an ultimately serious one;
in Kierkegaard's mind, at least, to fail to become a self is the ultimate human
failure.
So it shouldn't surprise us that there is a special Christian sense of humor, a
purchase on absurdity begotten of seeking God's kingdom, and thus seeing the
world from, as it were, God's perspective. This humor is rarely exemplified
because concerted seeking of the kingdom is rarely exemplified, and it isn't easy
to communicate, because most of its potential recipients are not very well qualified
for it. It takes a saint to smile this way, or at least a person who, through her
seeking, has come to know wherein sainthood consists. And further, it takes a
certain expressive talent to put this perception of absurdity in a way that makes
it available to an audience not immediately alive to it. Kierkegaard possesses
this sense of humor perhaps better than anyone, though Chesterton and C.S.
Lewis come to mind and-if Chesterton is to be believed-St. Francis of Assisi.
According to Chesterton a dramatic transformation of perspective occurs in
St. Francis' mind while he is in the cave of dark desperation to which he retreats
after suffering two enormous humiliations: of failing in a military exploit which
at the time he took to be God's will for him (though it was also to give him the
glory of a hero); and a court conviction of being a thief, which in a sense he
was, for he took some of his father's yardgoods and sold them to get materials
for rebuilding a church. In that cave Francis somehow comes to see humiliation
not as an impediment to his service of God and a blow to his self-worth, but as
itself his service of God and his own joy and crown.
"He saw himself as an object, very small and distinct like a fly walking on a
clear window pane; and it was unmistakably a fool. And as he stared at the word
'fool' written in luminous letters before him, the word itself began to shine and
change."12 This elemental shift in the foundation of Francis' self-esteem, this
view from beneath, transforms his perception of everything, giving it a look of
radical contingency: "He might see and love every tile on the steep roofs or
every bird on the battlements; but he would see them all in a new and divine
light of eternal danger and dependence. Instead of being merely proud of his
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strong city because it could not be moved, he would be thankful to God Almighty
that it had not been dropped."" In his enthusiasm for both God and what God
has made, Francis projects his own humbleness onto the creation. His God's-eye
perspective on things saves him from being a nature-worshiper, and this escape
from romaticism is a sense of humor: "For us the elements are like heralds who
tell us with trumpet and tabard that we are drawing near the city of a great king;
but [Francis] hails them with an old familiarity that is almost an old frivolity.
He calls them his Brother Fire and his Sister Water."!4 A man who salutes every
created thing from this perspective and out of this great enthusiasm for life, has
the wherewithal constantly within him for the light touch; nothing is "sacred"
because everything is sacred, being from the hand of God and utterly in His hand.
3

The grain of truth in Morreall's claim that a sense of humor requires the
absfmce of any ultimate commitment is better expressed in Kierkegaard's observation that a sense of humor about a situation requires the individual to have a
"way out,"!5 an expedient for backing off and objectifying the situation. It is
not, for example, that you can see the humor in somebody's being caught in a
lie only if you have no ultimate commitment to truthtelling; but rather that to
see the humor in the situation (without weakening your commitment), you need
an auxiliary belief which disemburdens you of total responsibility for correcting
the evil.
We have already seen how in St. Francis' case God's sovereignty allows for
Francis' light touch. William James thinks the only justification of a belief in
the Hegelian Absolute is that it enables us to be serious people without being
crushed or worn out by the seriousness. "What do believers in the Absolute
mean by saying that their belief affords them comfort? They mean that since,
in the Absolute finite evil is 'overruled' already, we may, therefore, whenever
we wish, treat the temporal as if it were potentially the eternal, be sure that we
can trust its outcome, and, without sin, dismiss our fear and drop the worry of
our finite responsibility. In short, they mean that we have a right ever and anon
to take a moral holiday, to let the world wag in its own way, feeling that its
issues are in better hands than ours and are none of our business."!6 The Christian
God, like the Hegelian Absolute, is in ultimate control. By malevolence, error,
or lassitude we may thwart Him provisionally, but He will prevail in the end.
Believing Him to exist is thus the "way out" by which, without relaxing her
seriousness, the Christian is able, in appropriate circumstances, to treat moral
evil with a light touch. Morreall's thesis that Christianity is incompatible with
a sense of humor seems to be traceable to a heterodox theology. His concept is
that of an impotently "good" god whose only positive attribute is his moral
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demand.
But the Christian rumor has it that God, characteristically but surprisingly,
has done more that just remain in ultimate control. In anticipation of the last
day He has subjected Himself to moral evil and in a mysterious reversal overcome
it. The consequence of God's act is that every act of human striving for righteousness is legally obviated and spiritually thrown, by the excessive contrast, in
a comic light. It is not of course morally or spiritually obviated, for full obedient
personhood before God remains the ultimate goal of human life and anything
less than it is just a shame. To quote Kierkegaard one more time: "Although it
is the utmost strenuousness, imitation [of Christ-that is, striving for righteousness should be like a jest, a childlike act-if it is to mean something in earnest,
that is, be of any value before God-the Atonement is the earnestness. It is
detestable, however, for a man to want to use grace, 'since all is grace,' to avoid
all striving."'7 So the atonement-the central Christian fact-holds out the possibility for a human life to be a synthesis of the deepest seriousness and the
lightest touch. The seriousness and the jest are mutually supportive. For the
humor and its attendant joy cannot be deep without the seriousness; and without
the "distance" afforded by the atonement the seriousness is "transformed into
agonizing anxiety in which a man is burned up, so to speak, and less than ever
begins to strive."'"
4
Having seen some reasons for thinking Morreall wrong when he says that a
person's having a sense of humor requires him or her to take nothing with
ultimate seriousness, let us tum to his other claim, that "the Christian God could
have no sense of humor. He knows fully everything and every event in the past,
present, and future, and so nothing that happened could surprise him. He could
not discover something he did not already know about, nor could he adopt a
new way of looking at anything. For these reasons, and because he is a changeless
being, nothing that happened could amuse God."'9
Let us begin by distinguishing surprise from what Morreall calls a "psychological shift." He mistakenly identifies these ideas. For a person to be genuinely
surprised by some perception or thought, the latter must be new to him, either
through his having never experienced it before, or through his having forgotten
it. Unless forgetting occurs, one cannot be surprised by the same experience
twice. By contrast, a person can experience a psychological shift many times.
A clear example of this is the shift which can be produced, often at will, in the
perception of the kind of figures used to illustrate gestalt psychology. When the
perception or thought to which one shifts is the awareness of an incongruity,
and some other psychological conditions obtain, the experience will be one of
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amusement. MorreaU may be right that all cases of humor involve some
psychological shift, but it is highly implausible to hold that surprise is essential
to the experience of humor. We are often amused again at old jokes, and it is
farfetched to save the surprise theory as Morreall does 20 by claiming that in being
amused again we are noticing some new (to us) dimension of incongruity. There
are situations of which the memory remains amusing for many years. After a
while we may not laugh out loud (it is slightly more plausible that surprise is
necessary to laughter than that it is necessary to humor), but we continue to be
amused, perhaps even throughout an adulthood.
No doubt surprise is an important contributing factor in the funniness of many
jokes. But its contribution seems to be that of making the incongruity striking,
vivid; and there are other ways this can be accomplished-for example, through
colorful presentation, choice of words, concreteness of detail. Another factor in
keeping a memory amusing is the individual's interest and involvement in it.
The essential thing here seems to be the "freshness," as we might call it, of the
perception of incongruity. Surprise is a powerful way of producing freshness,
and it is this fact that inclines us to think surprise essential.
But if it is freshness of construal, rather than surprise (or even the weaker
phenomenon of "shift"), that is basic to humor, then God's being omniscient
would not seem to rule out His having a sense of humor. For Him to appreciate
incongruities humorously He would have to 1) have a perspective of congruity
from which to appreciate incongruities; 2) have an interest in the matter of the
incongruities; and 3) be able to keep His perceptions of incongruity fresh. If
God's omniscience is such that He not only knows everything, but is also simultaneously attending with equal attention to everything, then perhaps His omniscience will rule out His fulfilling the first requirement. For the perception of
incongruities does seem to presuppose a certain selectivity of attention; it requires
that one way of focusing on things be "normal" for the percipient, so that another
can highlight incongruities. This is the truth in Morreall's concept of a psychological shift. But God's knowledge of everything may be partially dispositional;
His omniscience may not imply His omni-awareness, for He may have the power
to attend selectively to the things that are. In that case, of course, He is not the
radically "changeless being" that Morreall thinks God must be. But nothing in
the Christian tradition makes that interpretation of God's changelessness compulsory or orthodox. Nor is there anything in that tradition, that I know of, to rule
out God's interest in His creation or His power to keep His perceptions fresh.
In fact, as regards keeping perceptions fresh, I can't think of anybody more
likely to be able to do it, despite His advanced age.

Wheaton College (IL)
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